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71.
Incumbent politicians have a well-known advantage in seeking re-election. Using the Economic Freedom of North America dataset, we examine how changes in economic policy during an incumbent governor's tenure influence the probability of losing their re-election bid. Put simply, does economic policy matter for the incumbent advantage? The results suggest that a decrease in economic freedom increases the probability of an incumbent loss, regardless of the governor's party. A decomposition analysis indicates that these results are primarily driven by the government spending sub-index. Furthermore, a more granular analysis suggests that: (1) increases in government consumption spending and government employment are associated with a lower probability of re-election among Democratic incumbent governors, but a higher probability among Republicans; (2) increases in transfer payments relative to personal income reduce the likelihood of re-election, regardless of party; and (3) among Republican incumbents, increases of income taxation and of top marginal tax rates are associated with a higher and lower, respectively, probability of losing re-election. Finally, controlling for a variety of demographic, political and socioeconomic factors, we find that high unemployment increases the probability that an incumbent loses re-election, while increasing net population migration reduces it. 相似文献
72.
73.
The empirical results of the risk-return relationship are mixed for both mature and merging markets. In this paper, we develop a new volatility model to revisit the risk-return relation of the aggregate stock market index by extending the Realized GARCH model of Hansen et al. (2012) with the Wang and Yang (2013) framework, in which the overall risk-return relation is decomposed into a risk premium and a volatility feedback effect. An empirical analysis of three major Chinese stock indices reveals positive risk premium and negative volatility feedback effect, and those findings are stable across different markets and sub-samples. However, their relative magnitudes differ between markets and varies through time. 相似文献
74.
We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit. 相似文献
75.
从资金需求方出发,以2009年10月至2016年12月深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的公司为样本,实证检验了政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响,以及激励机制和监督机制这两种公司治理机制的调节作用,得到结论如下:政治关联企业倾向于在发展后期引入风险投资;政治关联企业倾向于选择国有性质、经验丰富以及参与程度高的风险投资机构;激励机制会加强政治关联企业在发展后期引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿;监督机制会减弱政治关联企业在发展后期阶段引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿。结论对拓展政治关联与风险投资领域的理论和实践具有重要启示意义。 相似文献
76.
Valuing Initial Public Offerings Using Article 11 Pro Forma Financial Information in the Prospectus*
We investigate whether Article 11 pro forma financial information assists investors in valuing IPOs. While the SEC expects it to be helpful in assisting investment decisions, Article 11 pro forma financial information is based on registrants' understanding and assumptions, and registrants can exercise their own judgment when preparing pro forma financial statements. It is therefore an empirical question whether the information contained in pro forma financial statements is useful to investors. We examine the association between pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity and the IPO offer value and find asymmetric results. While positive pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity are positively associated with the IPO offer value, negative pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity are negatively associated with the IPO offer value, suggesting that negative pro forma adjustments are priced as growth opportunities. Additional analyses reveal that the association between pro forma adjustments of book value of equity and the IPO offer value varies across different time periods and industries and that pro forma adjustments of book value of equity are initially mispriced by investors. In contrast, we do not find similar results for pro forma adjustments of earnings. Further empirical tests show that the asymmetric results of mispricing of pro forma adjustments of earnings and book value of equity may be explained by the requirements of Article 11 of Regulation S‐X for pro forma adjustments dictating that adjustments to earnings reflect only recurring items while adjustments to book value reflect both recurring and nonrecurring items. 相似文献
77.
A political leadership transition occurs in China every five years. This shift in leadership is accompanied by tremendous uncertainty within Chinese society, particularly for the nation's wealthy people. Examining private residential property transaction data in Singapore, this paper reveals that the number of transactions by Chinese mainland buyers increases by half during political transitions that occurred between 1998 and 2013, in comparison to buyers from Malaysia, the US, and Hong Kong. 相似文献
78.
We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks. 相似文献
79.
This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames’; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office. 相似文献
80.
We develop a simple two-region, cobweb-type dynamic partial equilibrium model to demonstrate the existence of optimal, possibly non-zero, trade barriers. A pure comparative statics analysis of our model suggests that a reduction of trade barriers, modeled as small but positive import tariffs, always enhances welfare. However, taking a dynamic perspective reveals that nonlinear trade interactions between two regions may generate endogenous price fluctuations which can hamper welfare. Finally, we allow special interest groups, such as consumers or producers from these two regions, to lobby for a particular level of trade barriers. Our model predicts that time-varying trade barriers may be another channel for market instability. 相似文献